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NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 73 OCTOBER 1998 NUMBER 4
CAPACITY AND RESPECT: A
PERSPECTIVE ON THE HISTORIC ROLE
OF THE STATE COURTS IN THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM
ELLEN A. PETERs*
Tiventy years ago, Justice William J. Brennan sounded a clarion call to lawyers and
judges not to overlook the capacity of state law, especially state constitutional law,
to assist in the pursuit of justice for all. Today; the judges and justices of state
courts have taken that message to heart by undertaking innovative measures to pro-
tect individual rights through state constitutions and through independent interpre-
tations of the Federal Constitution. Despite this emerging trend, litigators, law
reviews, and legal scholars have continued to focus on the federal system. In this
Brennan Lecture, Senior Judge Ellen A. Peters of the Supreme Court of Connecti-
cut responds to this not-so-benign neglect, observing that state courts determine the
totality of rights of the vast majority of lifigants, draw on a broad reservoir of com-
mon law principles and remedies, and play an integral role in maintaining our fed-
eralist system. Developing this last point, Judge Peters examines tie history of state
courts in the federal systen the extent to whicz state courts may invoke neutral
procedural and jurisdictional rules in the face of arguably different federal man-
dates, and the implications for the role of the states of recent developments in
United States Supreme Court jurisprudence-
The annual William J. Brennan Lecture Series at New York Uni-
versity School of Law performs a very special jurisprudential service
by promoting the interests of a wide-angled view of federalism.' Any
* Senior Justice, Supreme Court of Connecticut; Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Con-
necticut (retired); former President of the Conference of Chief Justices; former Southmayd
Professor, Yale Law School. I am grateful for the fine research assistance of Giovanna
Shay, J.D., Yale Law School, 1997.
1 This Article is an edited and annotated version of remarks delivered on February 11,
1998. The annual Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Lecture on State Courts and Social Jus-
tice is sponsored by The Institute of Judicial Administration and the Brennan Center for
Justice at the New York University School of Law.
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lecture series that focuses on the work of the state courts of this coun-
try makes a unique contribution to a better understanding of the con-
cept of dual sovereignty. Any lecture series in the name of Justice
Brennan affords a unique opportunity to reflect on the Justice's ex-
traordinary insight into the diverse facets of our nation's jurispru-
dence. Any lecture series that has engaged the wide-ranging interests
of my distinguished predecessors2 provides a unique occasion for as-
sessment of the contributions of state courts in furthering the Justice's
all-inclusive vision of American law.
Only once was I fortunate enough to meet Justice William J.
Brennan. Some fifteen years ago, he was the keynote speaker at a
conference held at the Columbia Law School. The subject of the con-
ference was an examination of constitutional law in other countries of
the world. As a state court judge, I quickly understood that my mis-
sion was to represent another one of those "other" countries. In all
candor, I remember nothing about the conference except the honor
and pleasure of meeting Justice Brennan. As has been observed uni-
versally, Justice Brennan was the soul of kindness and graciousness in
every personal encounter.3 It did not seem to matter to him that I was
only an obscure state court judge with little competence in constitu-
tional law. Our conversation was an unforgettable encounter to be
remembered and cherished forever.
The topic of this Article is an exploration of one aspect of the far-
reaching legacy that Justice Brennan left to state courts. More than
many federal judges and justices, he recognized the importance of
dual sovereignty as a structural component of our federal system. His
famous 1977 article, "State Constitutions and the Protections of Indi-
vidual Rights,"'4 was an eloquent and cogent reminder that because of
2 The first Brennan lecturer was Judith S. Kaye, the dynamic Chief Judge of the New
York Court of Appeals. See Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century:
Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
Chief Judge Kaye was followed by Justice Stewart Pollock, one of the most widely admired
justices on the New Jersey Supreme Court. See Stewart G. Pollock, The Art of Judging, 71
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 591 (1996). The third Brennan lecturer was Justice Stanley Mosk, a long-
time member of the California Supreme Court whose tireless devotion to judicial duty has
led him to continue to serve on that court past the normal age of retirement, despite ad-
verse economic consequences dictated by California law. See Cal. Gov. Code § 75075
(West 1992); Stanley Mosk, States' Rights-and Wrongs, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 552 (1997).
3 See Stephen Wermiel, William J. Brennan, Jr., in The Supreme Court Justices: Illus-
trated Biographies, 1789-1995, at 446, 449-50 (Clare Cushman ed., 2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter
Illustrated Biographies]; see also David Halberstam, The Common Man as Uncommon
Man, in Reason and Passion: Justice Brennan's Enduring Influence 22, 25-26 (E. Joshua
Rosenkranz & Bernard Schwartz eds., 1997) [hereinafter Reason and Passion]; William H.
Rehnquist, Foreword to Reason and Passion, supra, at 10.
4 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977).
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dual sovereignty, state law and state courts could play an important
role as guarantors of civil and political rights.S His article was a clar-
ion call to lawyers and judges not to overlook the capacity of state
law, especially state constitutional law, to assist in the pursuit of jus-
tice for all. From the state court perspective, his article was not only
of great substantive interest, but also served as a vote of confidence in
the integrity and the capacity of state courts to carry out these high
aspirations.
Twenty years later, the judges and justices of the state courts have
taken Justice Brennan's message to heart by undertaking innovative
measures to protect individual rights through state constitutions and
through independent interpretations of the Federal Constitution.
Some state courts are considering whether the failure to present a rea-
soned analysis of relevant state constitutional law, when federal con-
stitutional law is manifestly unpromising, may subject an attorney to a
claim of malpractice or of ineffective assistance of counsel.6 Even
when state constitutions use language similar to that found in the Fed-
eral Constitution, attorneys should be aware by now of the compe-
tence of state courts to construe such language independently.7 More
important, it should be old news that state constitutions contain some
provisions for which there are no federal counterparts.8
5 See id. at 498-504.
6 But see James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 Mich.
L. Rev. 761 (1992) (criticizing project of creating independent state constitutional analysis
and pointing out difficulties of crafting state constitutional claims).
7 For example, various provisions of the Connecticut Constitution have been inter-
preted to be more protective of individual liberties than the analogous federal provisions.
See, e.g., State v. Linares, 655 A.2d 737, 753-57 (Conn. 1995) (adopting more flexible,
speech protective approach to free speech questions under Article I, §§ 4.5 of Connecticut
Constitution than forum based analysis employed by United States Supreme Court); State
v. Oquendo, 613 A.2d 1300, 1308-09 (Conn. 1992) (holding that search and seizure clauses
of Connecticut Constitution, Article I, §§ 7, 9, are more protective of individual liberties
than Fourth Amendment of United States Constitution); State v. Dukes, 547 A2d 10, 17-
23 (Conn. 1988) (adopting more protective standard for judging motor vehicle searches
under Article I, § 7 of Connecticut Constitution than standard employed under Fourth
Amendment); State v. Stoddard, 537 A.2d 446,452 (Conn. 1988) (holding that, contrary to
result reached under Federal Constitution in Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,422 (1986),
Article I, § 8 of Connecticut Constitution requires police to inform a suspect of his or her
attorney's efforts to render legal assistance); see also Jennifer Friesen, State Courts as
Sources of Constitutional Law- How to Become Independently Wealthy, 72 Notre Dame
L. Rev. 1065, 1073 (1997); Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitu-
tionalism, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1147, 1154-57 (1993); Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the
Supreme Court: Continuing Methodology and Legitimacy Problems in Independent State
Constitutional Rights Adjudication, 72 Notre Dame L Rev. 1015, 1017 (1997).
8 New York's constitution contains a number of such provisions. It provides, among
other things, for the public support of the needy. See N.Y. Const. art. XVII, § 1. See
generally, Judith S. Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in Practice and Principle, 61 St. John's L
Rev. 399,409-10 (1987). Article I, § 8 of the New York Constitution provides greater pro-
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Connecticut courts, for example, must construe free standing con-
stitutional provisions, such as a right of access to the courts9 and a
right to a publicly financed elementary and high school education.10
Over the years, our state constitution has been amended to include an
equal protection clause that is especially capacious.'1 It forbids dis-
crimination based on "religion, race, color, ancestry, national origin,
sex or physical or mental disability"' 2 and prohibits both a denial of
the equal protection of the law and "segregation or discrimination. '13
Read conjointly, these distinctive state constitutional rights furnished
the underpinnings for our recent school desegregation case, Sheff v.
O'Neill.14
Despite this emerging trend in state court jurisprudence, Justice
Brennan's message, that state courts play an invaluable role in assur-
ing justice for all, has not resonated as well with other players in the
judicial arena. Litigants continue to invoke federal diversity jurisdic-
tection to the press than the Federal Constitution. See Richard J. Tofel, "Every Citizen
May Freely... Publish": Protecting the Press Under the New York State Constitution, 40
Syracuse L. Rev. 1041, 1044 (1989).
Criminal procedure is one area in which state constitutions commonly are more pro-
tective of individual rights than is the Federal Constitution. For example, although the
Federal Constitution permits less than unanimous verdicts in state criminal trials, the
Maryland Constitution requires a unanimous jury verdict for a criminal conviction. See
Md. Const. Decl. of Rights art. XXI. See generally Peter J. Galie, The Other Supreme
Courts: Judicial Activism Among State Supreme Courts, 33 Syracuse L. Rev. 731, 751-52
(1982).
Another evocative example is the provision in the New Mexico Constitution providing
a fundamental right of "seeking and obtaining safety and happiness." N.M. Const. art. II,
§ 4. The New Mexico Supreme Court recently relied on that provision for a narrow con-
struction of the term "fugitive from justice" for the purposes of the Extradition Clause,
U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, and the Extradition Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-3196 (1994). The court
refused to extradite a person within its jurisdiction to the demanding state, Ohio, because it
found a significant risk of his abuse by Ohio prison officials. See Reed v. State ex rel.
Ortiz, 947 P.2d 86, 106-08 (N.M. 1997). The United States Supreme Court reversed, how-
ever, in a brief opinion citing the Extradition Clause. See New Mexico ex rel Ortiz v.
Reed, 118 S. Ct. 1860, 1862 (1998). Presumably, although a state constitutional provision
may provide greater protection for individual liberties than an analogous federal provision,
it cannot, under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, conflict directly with a federal
constitutional mandate.
9 See Conn. Const. art. I, § 10; Binette v. Sabo, 710 A.2d 688, 690 (Conn. 1998); Kelley
Property Dev., Inc. v. Lebanon, 627 A.2d 909, 918 (Conn. 1993); cf. Jonathan M. Hoffman,
By the Course of the Law: The Origins of the Open Courts Clause of State Constitutions,
74 Or. L. Rev. 1279 (1995) (discussing history of state constitutions' open courts provisions
and arguing against interpreting such provisions as mandate to fashion new remedies).
10 See Conn. Const. art. VIII, § 1; Horton v. Meskill, 486 A.2d 1099, 1104-05 (Conn.
1985).
11 See Conn. Const. art. I, § 20.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 678 A.2d 1267, 1288 (Conn. 1996).
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tion and supplemental jurisdiction because they believe that federal
courts provide a more professional forum. 5 Law reviews, newspa-
pers, and U.S. Law Week continue to direct a disproportionate
amount of attention to the work of the federal courts.
Legal scholars also have failed to embrace Justice Brennan's
message. For example, scholars continue to publish casebooks on the
federal system that focus almost exclusively on the work of the federal
courts. The 1996 edition of Hart & Wechsler1 6 is an invaluable source
book for scholars, students, and practitioners. Nonetheless, it contains
some telling oversights. For example, when the authors describe the
prohibition against advisory opinions that is embedded in federal
law,17 they acknowledge that "other legal systems" have come to a
different conclusion.1 8 The "other legal systems" that they discuss are
those in foreign countries.19 The contrary practice in various Ameri-
can states, including their home state of Massachusetts, 20 is not even a
blip on their federalism radar screen.
A possible explanation for this not-so-benign neglect is the widely
shared perception that state courts are unimportant courts, lacking
economic resources and analytic brain power. How many federal
judges have been heard to say that the judges in their state courts are
deplorable, with the possible exception of a dear friend, Judge X?
Justice Brennan, himself formerly a state court judge, knew better.
Why then bother with state courts when they are considered by many
to be an intellectual waste land?
One potential answer is that state courts carry more than ninety-
five percent of th& nation's judicial workload.21 That figure wvill only
increase if Congress adopts the suggestions of the Federal Courts
Study Committee to limit diversity jurisdiction."" What we in the state
courts do, and how well or badly we do it, determines the totality of
15 See Ellen A. Peters, State-Federal Judicial Relationships: A Report from the
Trenches, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1887, 1888-89 (1992).
16 Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal
System (4th ed. 1996).
17 The "case or controversy" requirement of Article III, § 2 of the United States Con-
stitution, which underlies the prohibition on advisory opinions in the federal system, has no
counterpart in many state constitutions.
18 See Fallon, supra note 16, at 98.
19 See id.
20 See Mass. Cont. art. II, § 83.
21 See Brian J. Ostrom & Neal B. Kauder, Examining the Work of State Courts, 1993:
A National Perspective from the Court Statistics Project 3 (1995).
22 See Committee on Long Range Planning, Judicial Conference of the U.S., Proposed
Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts 29-35 (1995); see also Harlon Dalton. Judicial
Federalism and Individual Rights: Some Reflections on the Proposed Long Range Plan. in
Preserving Access to Justice: The Impact on State Courts of the Proposed Long Range
Plan for the Federal Courts (Report of the 1995 Forum for State Judges) 17 (1996).
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rights of the vast majority of litigants.' We are important because we
are there. State courts provide the major judicial forum for most
litigants.
A second answer might be that state jurisprudence raises issues
that differ in kind, not just in form, from those confronting the federal
courts. In previous Brennan lectures, both Chief Judge Kaye 24 and
Justice Pollock25 discussed the fact that state courts, even when their
immediate assignment is statutory or constitutional interpretation,
continue to draw upon a broad reservoir of common law principles.26
For example, the Connecticut state courts have relied on the common
law to determine that the language of state statutes must be applied so
as to accommodate state rights to bodily integrity 7 or to mesh with
state equitable principles governing foreclosures. 28 Conversely, state
courts may need to modify the common law to reflect the wisdom of
related statutory mandates.2 9 Many of us who serve on state supreme
23 Furthermore, federal statutory mandates and federal constitutional law all too often
shape and constrict popular and academic notions of civil rights law. Much of the work-
load of state courts, however, includes other areas of law, most notably family law, that
raise equally important human rights issues. In order to appreciate state courts' role in
shaping civil rights law, therefore, one must recognize the human rights dimensions of
uniquely state law domains.
As Anne C. Dailey has written recently:
Although in law, as elsewhere, we are accustomed to thinking of the family as
a private realm free from governmental influence and control, the domestic
sphere is deeply patterned by state laws regulating the formation, mainte-
nance, dissolution, and boundaries of family life. Legal regulation of the fam-
ily forms domestic roles, directs intimate relationships, and consequently
shapes human identity in profoundly normative ways. Legal decision-makers
confront fundamental questions concerning the meaning of parenthood, the
best custodial placements for children, the rights and obligations of marriage,
the financial terms of divorce, and the standards governing foster care and
adoption. In answering such questions, state legislatures and courts draw upon
community values and norms on the meaning of the good life for families and
children.
Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1787, 1790 (1995).
24 See Kaye, supra note 2.
25 See Pollock, supra note 2.
26 See generally Ellen A. Peters, Common Law Antecedents of Constitutional Law in
Connecticut, 53 Alb. L. Rev. 259 (1989). But see Hans A. Linde, Are State Constitutions
Common Law?, 34 Ariz. L. Rev. 215, 227 (1992) (cautioning that importing common law
methods into state constitutional analysis may lead to over reliance on "questionable
judge-made formulas"); Herbert Wilkins, Judicial Treatment of the Massachusetts Declara-
tion of Rights in Relation to Cognate Provisions of the United States Constitution, 14
Suffolk U. L. Rev. 887, 888 (1980).
27 See, e.g., McConnell v. Beverly Enters. Conn., Inc., 553 A.2d 596, 603 (Conn. 1989).
28 See New Milford Sav. Bank v. Jajer, 708 A.2d 1378, 1382-83 (Conn. 1998).
29 See, e.g., Fahy v. Fahy, 630 A.2d 1328, 1332-34 (Conn. 1993) (finding that legislative
change of laws governing child support requires change of common law principles gov-
erning alimony).
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courts see the creation of an integrated state jurisprudence, without
sharp lines of demarcation between constitutional law, statutory law,
and judge made law, as part of our judicial responsibility.
Accordingly, in the discharge of that judicial responsibility, we
have access to a wider range of remedial options than the federal judi-
ciary due to our different principles of separation of power.30 For ex-
ample, to implement an earlier state constitutional law decision
broadening the fights of litigants to challenge the impartiality of po-
tential jurors,31 we were able to invoke not only our constitutional
authority but also our supervisory authority over Connecticut courts.32
Going the route of supervisory authority leaves more flexibility for
further input from all the interested constituencies. For another ex-
ample, the availability of remedial flexibility led us, in our school de-
segregation case, Sheff v. O'Neill,33 deliberately to craft a mandate
that, in Lawrence G. Sager's nomenclature, underenforced our state
constitutional law.34
The implications of so extensive a judicial role merit greater at-
tention in the present national and international legal landscape. On
the national level, this is a time when uninformed criticism of judges is
once again rampant.35 Does the broad interpretation of judicial au-
thority add fuel to that fire?36 Internationally, this is a time when,
after careful consideration, many new democracies, faced with the an-
timajoritarian dilemma described twenty-five years ago by Alexander
M. Bickel in his book entitled The Least Dangerous Branch.3 7 have
gone a different route. They have decided to strengthen the indepen-
dence of their judiciaries by limiting the judiciary's authority to act.
30 See Ellen A. Peters, Getting Away from the Federal Paradigm: Separation of Pow-
ers in State Courts, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 1543, 1558-59 (1997).
31 See State v. Brown, 668 A.2d 1288, 1303 (Conn. 1995).
32 See Conn. Practice Book (1998) § 60-2 (formerly § 4183).
33 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
34 See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Under-
enforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L Rev. 1212 (1978) (discussing remedial
choices).
35 For media coverage of such criticism, see, e.g., Greg McDonald, Bill Imperils Judge's
Grip on Prisons, Houston Chron., Nov. 21,1997, at 1 (reporting House Majority Whip Tom
DeLay's (R-Sugerland) comment that Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 would -end
[Judge] William Wayne Justice's reign of error over the Texas prison system"); Cindy Moy,
Reactions Run Along Philosophical Lines After Hawaii Recognizes Same-Sex Marriages,
West's Legal News 13039, 1996 WL 694924, Dec. 6, 1996, at *2 (reporting that Tom
Pritchard of Minnesota Family Council denounced Hawaii Supreme Court's decision in
Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d 112 (Haw. 1996), as "bald legal activism").
36 See Linde, supra note 26, for a criticism of recourse to common law methodology in
the interpretation of state constitutional provisions.
37 See Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 16-23 (Yale Univ. Press
1986) (1962).
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Perhaps a countervailing principle may be derived from our long
standing common law heritage, which elsewhere is neither fully under-
stood nor shared. This is one of many issues confronting state courts
that would be enlightened by further discussion and guidance.
A third reason why state courts are important, the reason that is
the principal focus of this Article, is that state courts play an integral
part in maintaining our federalist system. The relationship between
federal law and the state courts is destined forever to be a work in
progress, with borderlines that continue to shift in response to chang-
ing political pressures and to changing schools of jurisprudence.
To illustrate why, in my view, strong state courts play an essential
role in federalism, this Article explores several aspects of the complex
relationship between state and federal courts. The first section will
examine the history of state courts in our federalist system, with par-
ticular attention to the role of state courts in safeguarding human
rights. The second section will discuss the extent to which state courts
may invoke neutral procedural and jurisdictional rules in the face of
arguably different federal mandates. Finally, the third section will ex-
amine the implications for the future role of state courts in our feder-
alist system given recent developments in United States Supreme
Court jurisprudence. 38
I
STATE COURTS' CHANGING ROLES IN THE
FEDERALIST SYSTEM
The debate regarding state courts' role in our federalist system
long predates Justice Brennan's call for a renewed state court activ-
ism. Questions about the proper relations between state and federal
courts have persisted ever since the adoption of our constitutional
government in 1789. At various times in our constitutional history,
these questions have been resolved differently due to changing per-
ceptions about the proper function of state courts. Differing assump-
tions about the competence and reliability of state courts, although
often unarticulated, undoubtedly have influenced the prevailing view
of the appropriate balance between state and federal judicial power.
38 Candor requires disclosure at the outset that I come to this topic without any creden-
tials as a veteran constitutional lawyer. Federalism is, alas, far removed from my past
scholarly expertise in the intricacies of the Uniform Commercial Code. The questions that
it raises are, however, of considerable importance for all state chief justices in the discharge
of their oversight responsibilities over state judicial systems.
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A. The Rich Heritage of State Courts and Constitutions
For a historical perspective on this issue, it bears remembering
that state courts have been discharging their judicial responsibilities
for many years and often have served as laboratories for the future
development of federal constitutional law.39 Furthermore, in states
along the eastern seaboard, such as New York and Connecticut, state
courts rendered important civil rights decisions predating the adop-
tion of the United States Constitution.40
It is difficult to gather much detailed information about the
agenda of early state courts because both arguments and opinions
often were presented orally rather than in writing and were filtered
through scriveners more focused on outcome than on reasoning.
Nonetheless, the early courts rendered far reaching decisions, espe-
cially on matters that would now be characterized as raising constitu-
tional questions. For example, as early as 1785, in Symsbury Case, the
Connecticut Supreme Court, without a qualm (but also, alas, without
much discussion), unanimously held unconstitutional a state statute
infringing on established rights to real property.4t Three years later,
in 1788, another Connecticut court unhesitatingly declared ex post
facto laws to be "inoperative. '42
Other early state courts presumably were equally forceful in im-
plementing civil rights provisions found in early state constitutions
that predate the adoption of the Federal Constitution. New York's
constitution of 1777 contained a guarantee of the right to counsel
43
while Massachusetts, during the same period, provided a broad right
to a jury trial.44 Indeed, satisfaction with existing state constitutional
law was one ground for opposition to the addition of an arguably su-
perfluous Bill of Rights to the Federal Constitution.45
The state judges who shaped the early contours of state constitu-
tional rights included public servants of great distinction. In Connecti-
39 See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (observing that each state "serve[s] as a laboratory" that may "try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country").
40 See also Peter J. Galie, Ordered Liberty- A Constitutional History of New York 1
(1996) (noting that between 1776 and 1787 original states adopted state constitutions that
later served as models for Federal Constitution).
41 Kirby 444, 447 (Conn. 1785). Although the dissenting judge disagreed on the facts,
he did not disagree with the principle. See Wesley NV. Horton, Day, Root and Kirby, 70
Conn. B.J. 407, 411 (1996).
42 See Place v. Lyon, Kirby 404 (Conn. 1788); see also Horton, supra note 41, at 411.
43 See Galie, supra note 8, at 764.
44 See Wilkins, supra note 26, at 924 n.220.
45 See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L Rev. 535,537 (1986); Kaye,
supra note 8, at 400-01 (1987).
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cut, in the years from 1786 to 1788, the five person bench included
Oliver Ellsworth46 and Roger Sherman. 47 During those same years,
the call of the state court calendar apparently did not prevent
Sherman and Ellsworth from serving as delegates to the Constitu-
tional Convention in Philadelphia. 48 Not surprisingly, although both
were staunch federalists committed to crafting an effective federal
government, they also were vigorous defenders of the independence
and the importance of state courts.49 Sherman was an outspoken
critic of plans to confer exclusive jurisdiction over federal law on the
federal courts.5 0 Both Sherman and Ellsworth participated in forging
the Madisonian Compromise, under which lower federal courts have
only limited jurisdiction over specifically identified federal causes of
action.51 On the principle that the devil is in the details, Ellsworth
served on the committee entrusted with filling in the interstices of this
bedrock constitutional principle.52
Despite numerous decisions at the Constitutional Convention to
respect the integrity of state government at the Constitutional Con-
vention, the accompanying debates and the Federalist Papers paint a
picture of ambivalence toward state courts. For example, Alexander
Hamilton, in Federalist Paper No. 81, chastised state courts for their
lack of prudence and independence and the excessive entanglement
"of a local spirit. ' 53 In contrast, in Hamilton's very next paper, the
oft-cited No. 82, he applauded the adoption of the principle of concur-
rent jurisdiction, without any visible concern regarding the capacity of
state courts to carry out their new mission as part of the new nation as
a whole.54
My limited exploration of early nineteenth century federalism
suggests that the state courts performed their assignments under fed-
46 Oliver Ellsworth is an interesting figure whose wide-ranging constitutional contribu-
tions have been insufficiently recognized. He drafted the Judiciary Act of 1789 which, for
more than one hundred years, left most of federal law to be enforced by state courts and
even now is the framework for state/federal judicial relationships. After four years of ser-
vice as the third Chief Justice of the United States, he returned to Connecticut in 1800 and
became once more a justice on our state supreme court, having declined to serve as its
chief justice. See James Buchanan, Oliver Ellsworth, in Illustrated Biographies, supra note
3, at 48-50.
47 See Horton, supra note 41, at 410.
48 See id.
49 See Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian
Compromise, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 39, 63 n.56 (1995).
50 See id.
51 See id.
52 See Buchanan, supra note 46, at 49.
53 The Federalist No. 81, at 486 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
54 See The Federalist No. 82, at 492-93 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
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eral and state law with little controversy except with respect to federal
authority to require states to enforce federal criminal law.55 Focusing
on that exception would, however, distort the overall picture. In 1801,
the Congress itself determined that it could not compel state courts to
perform the duties conferred upon them by the national govern-
ment.56 In 1842, in Prigg v. Pennsylvania,57 the Supreme Court
echoed that view. Throughout the antebellum period, state courts
generally were understood to have taken on concurrent jurisdiction,
not as a mandate of federal constitutional law, but out of a shared
sense of mutual and common interest.5 8
B. Early State Courts and Human Rights
An additional limitation on the reach of federal law in the first
part of the nineteenth century was that the United States Supreme
Court then construed the provisions of the Federal Bill of Rights as
not binding on state courts.5 9 It would be wrong, however, to infer
55 See Collins, supra note 49, at 84-86; Charles Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the
State Courts, 38 Harv. L Rev. 545, 580 (1925).
For example, in Davison v. Camplin, 7 Conn. 244 (1828), the Connecticut Supreme
Court concluded that state courts have no jurisdiction to enforce federal criminal law. The
court remarked:
Should it be said, that it is a matter of convenience to sustain jurisdiction in
cases of this nature; that courts and magistrates are not appointed by the
United States, to hear and determine these apparently trivial offences; nor has
Congress ordained and established such inferior courts as could, with propri-
ety, take cognizance of these offences; an easy reply can be made. The Con-
gress have the power. Let them occupy, with their courts, the whole judicial
ground. If from any motives, (and we are not at liberty to enquire at all on
that subject) they omit to ordain and establish inferior courts, or to vest judi-
cial power in courts already established; that cannot justify a court in Connecti-
cut in exercising judicial power of the United States, never vested in them by
the constitution, nor in obeying a law not made in pursuance of the
constitution.
Id. at 249.
56 See Collins, supra note 49, at 151-54.
57 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
58 See Collins, supra note 49, at 45-49.
59 In the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872), the United States Supreme Court
suggested that it was understood in the antebellum period that the Bill of Rights of the
Federal Constitution limited the power of the federal government alone:
The adoption of the first eleven amendments to the Constitution so soon
after the original instrument was accepted, shows a prevailing sense of danger
at that time from the Federal power. And it cannot be denied that such jeal-
ousy continued to exist with many patriotic men until the breaking out of the
late civil war. It was then discovered that the true danger to the perpetuity of
the Union was in the capacity of the State organizations to combine and con-
centrate all the powers of the State, and of contiguous States, for a determined
resistance to the General Government.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
October 1998]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
from the absence of federal strictures that state courts at that time
were oblivious to claims for human rights.
An individual state's own heritage sometimes provided constitu-
tional protections as a matter of state law, often as a result of the
state's common law. Early in the nineteenth century, Connecticut
courts held criminal defendants to be entitled, unconditionally, to the
assistance of counsel, for misdemeanors as well as for felonies.60 In a
similar vein, Connecticut courts held sheriffs personally liable for ille-
gal searches and seizures. 61
Later in the nineteenth century, on the eve of the Civil War, nu-
merous state court judges struggled to protect the rights of former
slaves by limiting the reach of the federal fugitive slave laws. Robert
M. Cover, in his book entitled Justice Accused: Antislavery and the
Judicial Process, described the demoralizing experience of Massachu-
setts judges who were called upon to enforce these laws. 62 Many state
judges faced the same dilemma of having to choose between their con-
sciences and their oaths to execute federal law faithfully.
For example, in 1854, in the case of Booth v. Ableman, 63 the Wis-
consin courts tried unsuccessfully to provide shelter for a man whom a
federal officer had arrested allegedly for helping a fugitive slave es-
cape.64 In the trial court, and in the state supreme court, Wisconsin
judges held the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 to be unconstitutional and
consequently declared the man's detention to have been illegal. 65 Pre-
Unquestionably this has given great force to the argument, and added
largely to the number of those who believe in the necessity of a strong National
government.
But, however, pervading this sentiment, and however it may have contrib-
uted to the adoption of the amendments we have been considering [the thir-
teenth and fourteenth], we do not see in those amendments any purpose to
destroy the main features of the general system. Under the pressure of all the
excited feeling growing out of the war, our statesmen have still believed that
the existence of the States with powers for domestic and local government,
including the regulation of civil rights-the rights of person and of property-
was essential to the perfect working of our complex form of government,
though they have thought proper to impose additional limitations on the
States, and to confer additional power on that of the Nation.
Id. at 82.
60 See State v. Davis, 506 A.2d 86, 91-92 (Conn. 1986).
61 See, e.g., Grumon v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 40, 48 (1814).
62 See Robert M. Cover, Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process, 229-32
(1975).
63 In re Sherman M. Booth, 3 Wis. 1 (1854).
64 See id. at 3-5.
65 See id. at 64-65:
We are of opinion that so much of the act of congress in question, as refers to
the commissioners for decision, the questions of fact which are to be estab-
lished by evidence before the alleged fugitive can be delivered up to the claim-
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dictably, the United States Supreme Court reversed. 66 It concluded
that state courts lack habeas corpus jurisdiction to review federal ac-
tion taken pursuant to federal law.67 On remittitur, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court did not modify its constitutional ruling but agreed to
obey the federal mandate on a different ground, namely a newly
found lack of state court jurisdiction because of intervening action by
a federal trial judge.68 The Booth decisions illustrate that at least one
antebellum state judiciary was willing to engage in a vigorous struggle
to safeguard human rights.
In sum, it was federal law and the federal courts that, bowing to
the perceived political imperatives of the time, provided the authorita-
tive voices that protected the economic rights of slave owners over the
human rights of people of color. Writing in 1943, Henry Steele
Commager reviewed the first one hundred and fifty years of United
States Supreme Court jurisprudence and concluded that:
[The record] discloses not a single case, in a century and a half,
where the Supreme Court has protected freedom of speech, press,
assembly, petition, or religion against Congressional attack. It
reveals no instance... where the [C]ourt has intervened on behalf
of the underprivileged .... It reveals, on the contrary, that the Court
has effectively intervened, again and again, to defeat Congressional
attempts to free the slave, to guarantee civil rights... to protect
workingmen, to outlaw child labor, to assist hard-pressed farmers,
and to democratize the tax system.69
Some state courts, at least, demonstrated their independence and
integrity by greater devotion to the call of social justice.
II
STATES' NEUTRAL RULES OF JURISDICTION
AND PROCEDURE
Throughout these vicissitudes in our constitutional history, there
have been procedural as well as substantive difficulties in implement-
ing appropriate state and federal relations. This section explores one
such significant, recurring question of federalism: whether Congress
ant, is repugnant to the constitution of the United States, and therefore void
for two reasons: First, because it attempts to confer upon those officers judi-
cial powers; and second, because it is a denial of the right of the alleged fugi-
tive to have those questions tried and decided by a jury, which we think is
given him by the constitution of the United States.
66 See Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506, 510 (1858).
67 See id. at 514-16.
68 See In the matter of Booth, 11 Wis. 498, 521 (1859).
69 Henry Steele Commager, Judicial Review and Democracy, 19 Vir. Q. Rev. 417,428
(1943), reprinted in Judicial Review in American History 103 (Kermit L Hall ed., 1987).
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may order state courts to carry out the mandates of federal legislation
and administrative regulations in disregard of preexisting state rules of
jurisdiction and procedure. This question, in turn, has two parts. The
sub-inquiries are: (a) whether federal law dictates the applicable rules
of procedure governing federal law claims litigated in state courts; and
(b) whether states must provide a forum, not available to state law
litigants, in which to litigate federal claims.
A. The Application of Neutral State Court Rules
The question of when a state court may apply its neutral rules of
procedure and jurisdiction to litigants' federal claims requires further
examination of the history of state and federal relations. The Civil
War and its aftermath produced seismic changes in the law of federal-
ism. By virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment and the authority that it
conferred upon Congress, 70 the independent policymaking role of
state law and state courts gradually became subject to ever greater
federal supervision. These changes challenged the authority of state
courts to invoke their own organic law in the face of seemingly con-
trary federal law.
Claflin v. Houseman,71 decided in 1876, was an early post-war op-
portunity for the Supreme Court to describe both the expansive au-
thority and the limitations of federal law.72 The Court held that, as a
general proposition, state courts had the power, and perhaps were re-
quired to exercise the power, to provide relief to all litigants with a
federal cause of action. 73 The Court did not, however, overrule its
1842 decision in Prigg v. Pennsylvania74 which had recognized a more
independent role for state courts. Furthermore, Claflin stated that
state courts were not required to entertain federal litigation that "in-
terfere[d] with the [state courts'] proper jurisdiction. '75 The Claflin
Court thus expressly linked state court concurrent jurisdiction over
federally prescribed causes of action with the continued viability of
state court rules of jurisdiction and procedure.
70 United States Constitution Amendment XIV, Section 1 states in relevant part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
United States Constitution Amendment XIV, Section 5 states: "The Congress shall
have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
71 93 U.S. 130 (1876).
72 See id. at 136-42.
73 See id. at 136.
74 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
75 Claflin, 93 U.S. at 137.
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In my view, the Civil War Amendments changed the role of state
courts more definitively than did the implementation of the New Deal
in this century. Nevertheless, the New Deal broadened federal au-
thority in general and furnished a mindset congenial to decisions like
Testa v. Katt76 which upheld congressional authority, in time of war,
to require state courts to assume concurrent jurisdiction. 77 Even that
case, however, reserved the possibility that some state jurisdictional
rules might limit the enforceability of a federal mandate.78
My limited exploration of the case law and the secondary litera-
ture suggests that federal law has not yet firmly decided the extent of
federal displacement of state rules of jurisdiction and procedure.
Since the 1912 decision in Mondou v. New York, 7 9 it has been ac-
cepted wisdom that state courts may not close their courthouse doors
so as to discriminate against rights arising under federal law. Plenary
civil rights actions under § 1983,80 accordingly, have become a staple
of state court dockets. The question that remains is whether and when
nondiscriminatory state jurisdictional and procedural rules are subject
to a federal override.
One argument for protecting state courts from a federal proce-
dural override is the well-established principle of federalism that pro-
hibits federal courts from challenging state court decisions concerning
the meaning and effect of state law, whether that state law is constitu-
tional, statutory, or of common law derivation. As the Supreme Court
reiterated only last year, in Johnson v. FankellSl: "Neither this Court
nor any other federal tribunal has any authority to place a construc-
tion on a state statute different from the one rendered by the highest
court of the state.... This proposition, fundamental to our system of
federalism, is applicable to procedural as well as substantive rules."82
Even more germane, the Court cited one of its former cases for the
proposition that "[t]he requirement that a state court of competent
jurisdiction treat federal law as the law of the land does not necessar-
ily include within it a requirement that the State create a court compe-
tent to hear the case in which the federal claim is presented."83
State rules of procedure may be outcome determinative in crimi-
nal as well as civil cases. Since the time of Wainwright v. Sykes.8 fed-
76 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
77 See id. at 394.
78 See id. at 393.
79 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
80 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
81 117 S. Ct. 1800 (1997).
82 Id. at 1804.
83 Id. at 1805.
84 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
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eral courts reviewing state court criminal convictions under habeas
corpus have been limited by the rule of procedural default.8 5 Under
that rule, federal courts have no authority to provide habeas corpus
relief for petitioners whose case histories demonstrate a failure to
comply with state rules of procedure. 86 The rule of procedural default
stems from the proposition that, as a matter of federal as well as state
law, such procedural lapses improperly interfere with full state court
consideration of an issue that a petitioner belatedly wants to raise in
federal court.87
The Wainwright decision is but one example of the principle of
federalism that state courts have the final word in rendering decisions
that rest on articulated, adequate, and independent state law
grounds.8 8 Some scholarly work has found yet another basis for pro-
tecting state authority over state rules of jurisdiction and procedure:
the federal constitutional provision guaranteeing to each state a re-
publican form of government. Deborah Jones Merritt suggests that
the guarantee was intended to protect state governments not only
from internal subversion but also from congressional overreaching. 89
Whatever the constitutional basis for recognition of state autonomy, it
is difficult to reconcile these views of federalism with unlimited con-
gressional authority to override state rules of procedure and of juris-
diction in concurrent jurisdiction cases.90
B. The Coercive Creation of State Court Jurisdiction
A related issue is whether Congress may require states to enlarge
the jurisdiction of state courts to hear federal causes of action. State
courts routinely accept concurrent jurisdiction over federal causes of
85 See id. at 87.
86 See id.
87 The converse of the federal courts' renewed respect for state procedural rules and
state court autonomy is that state judiciaries bear increased responsibility for interpreting
the mandates of both the state and federal constitutions and, ultimately, for safeguarding
the rights of criminal defendants. See Charles F. Baird, The Habeas Corpus Revolution:
A New Role for State Courts?, 27 St. Mary's LJ. 297, 311-15 (1996); Mosk, supra note 2, at
555, 559-66.
88 See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983).
89 See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism
for a Third Century, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 2-10 (1988).
90 Another possible source of analogy is the law that has developed under Erie Rail-
road Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Although Erie requires federal courts to follow
state substantive law in diversity cases, it permits federal courts to follow their own proce-
dures in enforcing such state law. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). One
might argue that the same distinction between substance and procedure applies to state
courts enforcing federal law. But see Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988); Brown v.
Western R.R. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 296 (1949); Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 187-89
(1947).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
1080 [Vol. 73:1065
CAPACITY AND RESPECT
action because virtually all such cases resemble actions that are cogni-
zable under state law. As the United States Supreme Court recently
reiterated in Printz v. United States,91 although state executives cannot
be drafted to carry out federal law, state judiciaries do not have simi-
lar immunity.92 Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause 93 and the Madis-
onian Compromise,94 state judiciaries bear a direct responsibility for
substantively implementing federal mandates. Nonetheless, it is un-
clear whether federal authority to confer substantive concurrent juris-
diction carries with it the authority to dictate the manner in which
state courts enforce federal law. To what extent does federalism pro-
vide a basis for a federal bypass around neutral, generally applicable,
state rules of jurisdiction and procedure?
A national conference of all the state chief justices debated this
issue in the summer of 1994. The context was a provision of the health
care bill that was discussed in the early years of President Clinton's
first term of office. 95 The bill arguably required state courts, but not
federal courts, to adjudicate any and all claims about medical care,
medical coverage, medical bills, and the like. Furthermore, the pro-
posed legislation was reported to be unusually specific about the man-
ner in which state courts were to exercise their federally mandated
jurisdiction. State courts would have been required to exercise exclu-
sive health care jurisdiction without any preliminary screening or fact
finding by state administrative agencies. As chief justices, we were
deeply concerned that enactment of such legislation, with or without
federal financial assistance, would have a crippling impact on crowded
state court calendars and limited state court resources. 96 Fortunately
for us, the air was cleared by the subsequent withdrawal of so intru-
sive a health care initiative.
More recently, the issue arose again, closer to home, when the
Connecticut Supreme Court heard a case dealing with state court en-
91 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
92 See id. at 2371-72.
93 U.S. Const. art. VI.
94 Under the Madisonian Compromise, the United States Constitution provides for the
creation of one Supreme Court and "such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain or establish." U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. See generally Collins, supra note 49,
at 42. As a result, state courts were expected to exercise sole or concurrent jurisdiction
over a wide range of federal causes of action.
95 See Mark Curriden, State Court Chiefs Flex New Muscle: Chief Justices' Confer-
ence Sheds Benign Image and Challenges Washington, 17 Natl. L.J., Oct. 17, 1994, at Al
(discussing state supreme court justices' reaction to elements of Clinton's health reform
plan that would have increased workload of state courts). See generally Sharon Mcllrath,
The Battle Begins (Health Care Reform), Am. Med. News, Oct. 11, 1993, at 3.
96 Possibly, Congress ultimately would have eased our load or provided ample federal
resources. Neither possibility was anything other than a very long shot.
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forcement of the federal program for protection of the rights of the
disabled. 97 No one involved in this litigation questioned the propriety
of engaging in state adjudicatory processes to implement this invalua-
ble federal program. The question was, rather, one of state adminis-
trative law. For litigants unhappy with the outcome of state
administrative decisions about disability claims, the federal statute
and its accompanying regulations seemed to require state trial level
courts to take jurisdiction to review the case on its merits.98 For other
litigants, invoking similar state programs, state law seemingly prom-
ised only administrative but not judicial review.99 Could federal law
bypass state law and enlarge the jurisdiction of our trial courts? 100
What weight should be assigned to the fact that, by resisting the siren
song of federal grant money, the state could have sidestepped the
problem? 101 It was a puzzlement. We too ended up sidestepping the
problem by retroactively applying a state statute that, as a matter of
state law, conferred on all disability claimants an express state right to
judicial review.102 Sooner or later, however, state and federal courts
will have to confront the issue head on.
97 See Toise v. Rowe, 707 A.2d 25 (Conn. 1998).
98 See id. at 26.
99 See id. at 28-29.
100 See Collins, supra note 49, at 196 ("[E]ven those [of the Founding Generation] who
argued for a more cooperativist federalism seem not to have admitted the possibility of
jurisdictional coercion."); Jed Rubenfeld, The Federal Question, in Preserving Access to
Justice: The Impact on State Courts of the Proposed Long Range Plan for the Federal
Courts (Report of the 1995 Forum for State Judges) 7, 17 (1996). But see Saikrishna
Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1957, 2037 (1993) ("[Wjhere
the federal government has the constitutional authority to act, it may command the assist-
ance of state executives and courts.").
101 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987); see also Lewis B. Kaden, Politics,
Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 848, 893 (1979) (find-
ing that "[a]t times the lower courts do seem to suggest that the extent of economic pres-
sure to participate in a federal program is pertinent to the validity of a condition");
Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 Yale L.J. 1196, 1250 (1977) (stating
that "grant conditions may not contravene any of the constitutional prohibitions that limit
the exercise of all federal powers"); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions,
102 Harv. L. Rev. 1413, 1430 (1989) (observing that "[t]he Court has been reluctant in
practice to find that conditions on federal spending coerce recipients"); Note, Federalism,
Political Accountability, and the Spending Clause, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1419, 1431 (1994)
(stating that "[t]he problem is that Congress may purposefully avoid accountability by re-
quiring the states, through their legislative apparatus, to implement federal policies").
102 See Toise, 707 A.2d at 28.
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III
THE NEW FEDERALISM OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT
Further federal incursions into state court autonomy are less
likely today than they would have been twenty-five years ago. The
"new federalism" that has emerged from recent United States
Supreme Court decisions signals a sea change in the Court's attitude
about state courts and has further underscored the importance of
some measure of state court independence to dual sovereignty.
The most directly relevant example of the new federalism is the
widely cited 1991 case Gregory v. Ashcroft,10 3 written by another for-
mer state judge, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. In Gregory, the Court
held that federal law presumptively has limited authority to alter basic
structural aspects of state governments.104 Despite the federal laws
that protect most state workers from mandatory retirement, the Court
held that states retained the authority to require high ranking state
officers, including judges, to retire at the age of seventy.105
Other recent United States Supreme Court decisions also reaf-
firm a newly articulated confidence in the integrity and reliability of
state law and state courts. Cases such as Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida0 6 have repositioned the defining markers of present day fed-
eralism to afford more authority to the states.107
In short, the auguries for greater state court autonomy over struc-
tural rules governing the procedures and the jurisdiction of state
courts have not been better at any time within present memory. Since
the turn of the century, when Langdell introduced the caselaw method
into legal education, state courts have been a respected repository of
jurisprudential learning with regard to basic first term law school
courses such as torts and contracts. Today, state courts again have
taken joint responsibility, with the federal courts, for the protection of
civil and political rights. Full implementation of this challenging
agenda can only be strengthened by recognition of state autonomy
wherever appropriate. When federal courts acknowledge the vitality
103 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
104 See id. at 460-63.
105 Id. at 460. As Chief Justice, I welcomed that decision. I still welcome the principle
in theory, but, now that my own retirement looms just over the horizon, my enthusiasm has
diminished somewhat.
106 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
107 See also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding Gun Free School
Zones Act unconstitutional because Congress had made no findings regarding effect of
violence in and around schools on interstate commerce); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that Congress may not compel state legislatures to enact a federal
regulatory program).
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of structural rules of state law, they help to underscore the capacity of
state courts to respond to all of their agendas, including human rights
challenges.
CONCLUSION
As history demonstrates, both state courts and federal courts pro-
vide important safeguards for human rights. Sometimes the leading
role has been played by one set of courts and sometimes by the other.
An increasingly heterogeneous society is best served by encouraging
the checks and balances that flow from dual sovereignty.108
Without question, twentieth century state courts should have ac-
ted much sooner to fulfill their longstanding obligation to protect civil
and political rights. When federal decisions gradually required state
courts, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, to enforce the Fed-
eral Bill of Rights, 10 9 many state courts felt no need to extend them-
selves beyond the federal law. Some mistakenly looked to federal law
to provide shelter from criticism of unpopular constitutional decisions.
Others, to the great dishonor of all state courts, fiercely resisted en-
forcement of any basic rights of freedom and self-expression. Predict-
ably, abdication or abuse of state court power bred disrespect for state
court authority.
As state courts, in some instances belatedly, have returned to
their human rights agenda, they need recognition of their renewed
competence and reliability as instruments of justice. Justice Brennan's
message could not have come at a more opportune time. For the na-
tion's most outstanding protector of civil and political rights to en-
courage litigants to pursue their claims in state court, under state law,
was a much needed boost to state court self-respect. His message was
received warmly, not only for its substance, but also for its vote of
confidence that state courts would again assume the responsibility for
their human rights agenda and would discharge that responsibility
108 See Randall T. Shepard, The Maturing Nature of State Constitution Jurisprudence,
30 Val. U. L. Rev. 421, 436-40 (1996) (arguing that "meaningful differences" exist among
states that legitimately can produce different outcomes in state constitutional questions).
109 See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796 (1969) (holding Double Jeopardy Clause
of Fifth Amendment applicable to states); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)
(finding Sixth Amendment right to jury trial applicable to states); Klopfer v. North Caro-
lina, 386 U.S. 213, 223-26 (1967) (holding Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial applica-
ble to states); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967) (holding Sixth Amendment
right to compulsory process applicable to states); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964)
(holding Fifth Amendment's privilege against self incrimination applicable to states);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-40 (1963) (holding Sixth Amendment's right to
counsel applicable to states); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961) (holding fourth
Amendment's exclusionary rule applicable to states).
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with renewed sensitivity and vigor. Indeed, reading his article may
have brought able judges to the state bench who otherwise might have
declined to serve.
Greater respect for the integrity of state court undertakings, both
procedural and substantive, will enable the state bench to make the
sometimes controversial decisions that need to be made. When fed-
eral authorities signal their respect for the independence of state insti-
tutions, they help state judges and justices exercise their full capacity
and authority to enforce both tiers of constitutional protection. In the
final analysis, such assurance may prove to be at the heart of Justice
Brennan's legacy to us. We are grateful for his vision, and for the
opportunity to work to fulfill it.
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